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from the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the effectiveness of an Audit Committee (AC) operating in a large 
government statutory body in an emerging economy, namely the Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (IRBM). Prior studies focussing on AC effectiveness in relation to the public sector 
are sparse. Data collection was through in-depth interviews with key individuals involved in 
the IRBM governance process, including AC members, senior management and external 
auditors. We find the existence of a weak AC governance function that inadequately oversees 
financial reporting and internal control systems and that the independence of AC members is 
questionable since a communication gap exists between AC members and the external auditor. 
Our study highlights that top management should ensure that its AC fulfils its assigned role 
and that urgent attention is given to issues on composition, appointment and diligence of its 
AC members. We conclude that the IRBM should consider improving independence by 
appointing an external independent AC member(s) from either the big four or an influential 
industry expert to provide the necessary input and expertise to ensure that public confidence 
continues. 
 
Keywords: Accountability, Audit Committees, Effectiveness, Inland Revenue Board, 
Malaysia  
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Introduction 
Over the last few decades, the rise of new public sector reforms along with economic crises 
have applied pressure on governments worldwide to observe good governance in order to 
restore public trust and confidence (Brinkerhoff, 2008; De Vries and Namec, 2013). It was high 
profile cases such as Enron and Worlcom that pointed to the failure of corporate governance in 
general and of Audit Committees (ACs) in particular in undertaking their work effectively 
though an AC comprised of well-qualified individuals. Consequently, the accounting 
profession became subject to criticism as pressures mounted, increasing questioning of the 
quality of financial reporting and auditing. In promoting audit quality and to restore public 
confidence in the accounting profession, the importance of the AC’s role continues to be highly 
relevant (see DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Davies, 2009; Holmes 
and Zaman, 2012; Fitzgerald and Giroux, 2014).  
 
Although a growing body of literature relates to ACs in the private sector, only a few studies 
have examined the organizational context and process of AC operations in relation to public 
sector organisations (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pollitt, 2011). In this light, Subramaniam 
et al. (2013) emphasised that public sector governance practice could best be understood 
through systematic examination of managers’ understandings and perceptions of factors that 
facilitate or inhibit good governance. Similarly, attempting to understand the role and function 
of the AC through the perceptions of members and senior managers of an organization could 
provide valuable insight about the importance of what constitutes ACs’ real practice.  
 
Despite the importance of ACs in government organisations, research studies in this area are 
rare and tend to focus on the private sector. AC members are reported to lack competence in 
undertaking their role and function, with serious repercussions on the quality of financial 
statements assurance (see for example Magrane and Malthus, 2010; Purcell et al., 2014). When 
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the issue on AC competence is examined, this draws attention to an essential element on AC 
effectiveness, i.e. the process involved for proper functioning of the AC. The governance of 
ACs is not solely effected by the existence of formal structure and process but is also dependent 
on the informal interaction with other internal parties as well as internal and external auditors 
(Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007). For this reason, our main 
objective is to explore the governance role played by the AC in one of the largest Malaysian 
public administrations set up as a statutory body1, namely the Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (IRBM). The IRBM, as an agent for the government, was provided autonomy to 
assess, enforce and collect direct taxes. Therefore, the IRBM has the responsibility to ensure 
the quality and the effectiveness of the overall administration of direct taxes. In considering 
the fiscal and public accountability burden that it carries, it would be worthwhile to subject the 
IRBM to rigorous examination to establish whether or not the AC practices of the IRBM are 
in line with the provision of Malaysian statutory acts. Therefore, this study has two specific 
aims; first, we attempt to ascertain the accountability and governance practices, specifically the 
role of the AC within the IRBM organisational framework. Our second aim is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the AC in discharging its duty.  
 
Several studies have indeed focussed on IRBM. However, these studies have mainly relate to 
tax determination and assessment issues (Loo et al., 2010; Dandago and Hassan, 2013; Isa, 
2014; Mohamad et al., 2016) and the usefulness of tax audits (Isa and Pope, 2011; Nordin et 
al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explores the governance role 
of the AC in the IRBM, and therefore a study of this nature fills an important gap in the 
literature not only from a government statutory body standpoint but also from an emerging 
                                               
1 Some examples of statutory bodies in Malaysia are Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), Securities 
Commission of Malaysia and Electoral Commission of Malaysia. 
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country perspective. In addition, this study directly responds to a call for qualitative case study 
research using semi-structured interviews to explore the governance role of ACs (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008; Hegazy and Stafford, 2016) in contrast to the typical quantitative research 
(Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Goodwin, 2003; Davies, 2009; Cai et al., 2015).  
 
A further contribution is that our study touches upon corporate governance theory. Berle and 
Means (1932), in their seminal study, introduced the concept of separation of ownership and 
control through shareholding and the subsequent disputes. This later produced an important 
economic-based theoretical framework contributing to the concept of corporate governance, 
i.e. the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) generally defined the agency relationship 
as a contractual relationship between the shareholder as the principal and the managers as 
agents who are given authority to perform services on behalf of the principal. Prior research 
has also claimed that the agency theory provides understanding into the concept of analysing 
the governance relationship and outcomes of the particular organization (Gillan, 2006; Brennan 
and Solomon, 2008; Merino et al., 2010). Analyzing through the lens of agency theory, this 
study raises concerns on the overall effectiveness of the AC at the IRBM in the context of its 
independence and oversight function. This brings about an important question on the ability of 
the AC to drive IRBM towards compliance to legislation and meeting societal norms and 
community expectations (see for example Thomas and Purcell, 2018).   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature 
review and focusses on the effectiveness of ACs. The literature review also discusses issues 
relating to the accountability and credibility of public sector entities in general. This is followed 
by a section discussing the background to IRBM. Our next two sections describes the research 
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methodology and a thematic discussion of our findings, respectively. The final section 
summarises the conclusion and outlines some possible implications of the study. 
 
Review of Literature 
The formation of an AC and a sound internal audit is a cornerstone in establishing good 
corporate governance to reduce organisational risk (Goh, 2009; Bédard and Gendron, 2010; 
Purcell et al., 2014; Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015; Hegazy and 
Stafford, 2016). The requirement for ACs to be more effective was given prominence after the 
financial collapses in the early 2000s. The US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 specified the duties 
of ACs in scrutinizing the financial statements and related disclosures and reviewing reports of 
internal and external auditors regarding internal control issues. In providing quality assurance, 
ACs are obligated to review and monitor the work performed by internal audit functions 
(DeZoort et al., 2002; Davies, 2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). To achieve this, an AC should 
demonstrate strong governance and be competent, independent and transparent in providing 
full disclosure to both shareholders and other stakeholders alike (Graham et al., 2005; Barth 
and Schipper, 2007; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Billings and Capie, 2009; Bédard and 
Gendron, 2010; Redmayne et al., 2011).  
 
Prior studies have shown that ACs’ independence and competency provide effective 
monitoring and allowed for better evaluation of internal and external audit functions (Beasley 
and Salterio, 2001; Goodwin, 2003; Zain et al., 2006). The effective monitoring role of ACs 
can also increase with a close working relationship between ACs and external auditors (Beasley 
and Salterio, 2001; Farber, 2005). Some studies have even reported a positive correlation 
between the internal audit function and AC effectiveness (Goodwin, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 
2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Davies, 2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). Such evidence 
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further indicates that the effective communication and direct reporting line between the AC 
and the internal auditor are important, as the AC’s decision depends on the information and 
results performed by the internal auditors (Turley and Zaman, 2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 
2007).  
 
Several empirical studies have further highlighted AC effectiveness issues. AC effectiveness 
can be identified through competency (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993, p. 27), diligent oversight 
efforts (DeZoort et al., 2002), added value to the organization (NACD, 2000), fulfilling its 
responsibilities (Rittenberg and Nair, 1993) and frequent meetings to discuss the discovery on 
the issues of internal control and to reduce fraud risk (Farber, 2005). Other researchers, such 
as Gendron and Bédard (2006), have conducted in-depth interviews with several key players 
in three large Canadian publicly listed entities to examine the processes relating to AC 
effectiveness. The researchers implied that the concept of AC effectiveness can be translated 
into several dimension of AC process and outcome. Their research highlighted that ACs have 
enough power to perform their governance task in reviewing the financial statement and 
overseeing the internal control system, although ACs have less ability to detect fraud. Other 
researchers such as Yu-Hsuan Wu et al. (2016) have examined the relationship between AC 
independence, auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) and the likelihood of auditor going-
concern decisions in failed UK companies. Their study reported that only 34% of failed UK 
companies tended to receive auditor going-concern modifications on their financial statements. 
Their empirical findings also claimed that the AC’s characteristics are mediated to the auditor-
provided NAS on auditor reporting decisions. The results showed that independent and expert 
ACs are less likely to issue unmodified going-concern reports prior to company failure. 
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Focussing on the public sector, several studies have highlighted that the credibility of the AC 
in providing reasonable assurance is still being questioned due to a lack of sufficient 
knowledge, experience and skills relating to the overall operation and process of these public 
entities (Magrane and Malthus, 2010; Purcell et al., 2014). For example, Magrane and Malthus 
(2010) conducted semi-structured interviews to examine the AC effectiveness in New 
Zealand’s public sector. Their study revealed concerns over the independence of AC members 
and their competency while undertaking their audit task due to member rotation practices. 
Meanwhile, in an Australian-based study, Purcell et al. (2014) highlighted that in the local 
government of Victoria, the AC was introduced to act as a mechanism to assist council 
members and executive management towards honest stewardship. This included maintaining 
reliable systems of internal control and enhancing internal auditors’ independence. Purcell et 
al. (2014) also suggested that, as a way forward in improving local government governance, 
the governance structure and AC effectiveness needs to be reinforced by providing oversight 
of compliance, governance, internal control and risk mitigation.  
 
In addition, Davies (2009) reported that the significant relationship between the AC and 
internal auditor would result in the effective communication and promotion of a sound 
corporate governance system in the local government in Wales, United Kingdom. In a similar 
study, Subramaniam et al. (2013) identified those factors that may affect the corporate 
governance of state government agencies in Australia. Their study highlighted that the culture 
of good working relationships and sharing understanding among governance players in 
different functional areas could result in effective corporate governance. In an Eastern 
European context, Raudla et al. (2015) conducted a Estonian-based study that focussed on 
public officials who had been involved in performance audits between 2005 and 2012 to 
address the impact of performance audits on public sector organizations. The researchers 
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indicated no such trade-off between auditor accountability and audit performance, though, 
surprisingly, the results of the survey showed that less than 10% of the respondents uphold the 
value of accountability in evaluating audit performance. In addition, Raudla et al. (2015) 
asserted that an increase in AC effectiveness would result in a positive performance audit as 
perceived by auditees. Recently, Hegazy and Stafford (2016) highlighted findings on the 
important governance role of the AC in two UK public sector organisations, i.e. foundation 
trusts and local authorities. The researchers revealed that improvements on the AC governance 
mechanism (i.e. membership, competency) enhanced the accountability of both UK public 
entities in relation to their internal control system and financial reporting quality.  
 
Studies on the audit quality in the public sector in the emerging economies provide some 
suggestions on the extent of work in this area. For instance, Chowdhury et al. (2005) revealed 
that there exists a gap between the report issued by the Bangladesh Auditor General (AG) and 
the expectations of its users. The gaps exist because the Public Account Committee has a lack 
of training and not much knowledge on public sector governance. In the context of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Kiraka et al. (2002) suggested that the 
legislation of member countries under their investigation strengthen their oversight of audit 
officials to ensure their accountability. Meanwhile, issues on the Malaysian public sector have 
gained the interest of several researchers. Said et al. (2016), for example, argued that the 
integrity of the Malaysian public sector is determined by practicing strategic planning, audit 
and fraud control. On the other hand, Ahmad et al. (2009) asserted that the involvement of the 
AC in the public sector could enhance the effectiveness of internal audit functions and maintain 
their audit independence from management pressure. Hence, the AC, which is independent 
from management, has sufficient knowledge and experience auditing the organization and 
therefore would be able to monitor the government activities and identify its potential risk. 
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Therefore, the above discussions highlight serious concerns on the need for effective 
governance mechanisms to be in place in government organisations and provide direction for 
the current study on AC effectiveness in the IRBM.  
 
Background to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia   
To ensure that public sector expenditure, revenue and assets are equitably managed, the Auditor 
General’s Department was established to audit the public sector. In 1998, the Malaysian Prime 
Minister’s Department stipulated a mandatory requirement for Federal Statutory Bodies (FSBs) 
to establish ACs in their organizations and specified clearly that the role of the AC is crucial in 
overseeing the management of the FSBs in their day-to-day operations. Meanwhile, the 
Malaysian Statutory Bodies (Accounts and Annual Reports) Act 1980 emphasised that the FSB 
shall within six months of the financial year-end submit the Financial Statements to the Auditor 
General for audit. Furthermore, Articles 106 and 107 of the Federal Constitution and the Audit 
Act 1957 require the Auditor General to audit the financial statements, financial management 
and the activities and management of both the government agencies and government-linked 
companies. Reports on those findings are to be submitted to His Majesty for Royal assent and 
for it to be tabled in Parliament for debate (National Audit Department, 2015).  
 
The IRBM, as one of the government agencies established under the Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia Act 1995 has been given the autonomy to manage all the collection of government 
tax administration including income tax, petroleum income tax, real property gain tax and other 
taxes so that the agency may achieve the targeted total revenue collection. As at end of 2017, 
the IRBM has successfully increased the tax collection by 8.15% amounting to RM123.23 
billion (Kanyakumari, March, 2018). As with other FSBs, the IRBM has included in its 
governance structure the pivotal role of the AC as being responsible for providing oversight 
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functions that enhance audit quality and that build public confidence in the integrity of financial 
reporting. The establishment and governance role of the AC is subject to the Term of Reference 
set out by the IRBM2.  
 
Research Methodology 
Our study is exploratory in nature and employs a case study approach. A case study method 
has been commonly used as the research method in the social sciences to allow researchers to 
explore the characteristics of real life events, such as small group behaviour (such as ACs), and 
organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 2009). The AC Term of Reference mentioned 
above and the governance role of ACs discussed in the literature have been used to guide us in 
our evaluation on the effectiveness of the AC of the IRBM. We opted to utilise the in-depth 
interview method to provide us with ideas emanating from the interviewees and to explore all 
factors that underpin the answers from the participants such as reason, opinion and belief 
(Lewis and Ritchie, 2003; Turner, 2010). A researcher was tasked to interview seven key 
players in the governance structure of the IRBM who are directly involved with the 
organisation’s AC. These interview participants are: AC Chairperson; AC members; Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO); Director of Finance Department; Director of Internal Audit 
Department (IAD); Director of Risk Management Division; and, finally a senior member of 
the external audit team. Our interviews took place in the IRBM’s headquarters, where most of 
the interviewees are based, lasted approximately 1 to 2 hours in length and were guided by a 
set of pre-determined questions and additional probing. Table 1 presents the detailed 
background of our interview participants. It can be seen that all of our interviewees were 
experienced individuals and were able to provide valuable information. 
                                               
2 The Term of Reference for ACs was set out by the IRBM’s Board Secretariat Legal Advisory Department and 
became effective on 23 September, 2016. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
To facilitate our analysis, we transcribed our interview data to analyze interview responses. 
The main ideas and statements were highlighted and additional comments recorded. Content 
analysis was used to aid in the classification of the textual interview data for any of the themes 
that emerged from discussions with interviewees. All phrases, sentences and statements 
contained in the interview data were reviewed in relation to the themes and then organized into 
the most relevant category. In analyzing our interview data to determine emerging themes for 
our findings, elements of agency theory on independence and oversight functions of ACs were 
used to guide our analysis.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
This section discusses the main findings obtained from our interviews based on the themes that 
emerged from our discussions with the key governance actors in the AC process of the IRBM. 
The findings are presented in the subsections below.  
 
The Role of the IRBM Audit Committee 
In relation to the important role played by the AC in the IRBM, our interviewee responses 
varied as each interviewee provided his/her own perspective on how the AC influences the 
IRBM’s operations. For example, the Director of IAD reported that the AC’s role is significant 
in garnering public confidence and is a mechanism for instituting checks and balances, since 
the IRBM is responsible for tax administration in the country. The Director of IAD remarked: 
 
“The AC ensures the public that good corporate governance is in 
place in the IRBM. The AC also oversees the establishment of 
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effective risk management, internal control and good 
governance.” 
 
Meanwhile, the CEO of the IRBM highlighted the AC’s capacity in shaping corporate culture 
within the organisation. The CEO emphasised this well and remarked:  
 
“Our AC makes positive impacts on maintaining and enhancing 
a strong corporate culture. I know that our AC promotes a culture 
of integrity and high-efficiency at all levels of the organisation.” 
 
Other interview participants were of the view that the AC held mainly a monitoring and 
supervisory role. For example, an AC member and another two Directors of the IRBM 
interviewed (i.e. Director of Finance Department and Director of Risk Management Division) 
highlighted the responsibilities of the AC in ensuring that the IRBM’s financial statements 
comply with the standards and regulatory requirements3. Interestingly, a discussion on the role 
of the AC emphasised the fact that the AC is independent in undertaking all the responsibilities 
mentioned. An AC member remarked:  
 
“The AC is a committee of the board and is independent from 
the management. By this, the committee needs to make 
                                               
3 On March 2013, the Malaysian Public Sector Accounting Standards (MPSASs) were developed and governed 
by the Accountant General’s Department (AGD) to enhance public sector accountability and transparency by 
implementing high-quality accounting standards in the preparation of financial statements. Generally, the 
development of MPSASs is drawn from International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs), which are 
published by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Later, in November 2015, MPSASs 33 was 
introduced, which requires all public sector entities, including the IRBM, to practice accrual basis in reporting 
their financial statements. This is, however, yet to be implemented. 
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accountability a real practice in the organization in all the work 
done to ensure that its accountability is fulfilled.” 
 
Curiously, it was revealed by a number of our interviewees that no meetings are held between 
the AC and the external auditor despite there being a stringent requirement for the AC to hold 
such a meeting at least once a year, as specified in the Term of Reference of the IRBM’s AC. 
However, this non-compliance was justified with a cautious remark that such meetings will be 
undertaken in the future. The AC Chairperson pointed out: 
 
“We didn’t meet with the external auditor because there is no 
problem with the IRBM accounts. We reviewed the accounts 
before it was submitted to the Treasury for audit. In this case, we 
found that all the presentation and information in the accounts is 
acceptable.” 
 
Studies have indicated that informal interaction between the AC with top management and an 
external auditor enhance the reporting quality of financial statements and ensure adequacy of 
internal control within the organization (Turley and Zaman, 2007; Davies, 2009; Salleh and 
Stewart, 2012; Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014). Nevertheless, the Director of IAD provided 
assurance that future engagement with the external auditor will be held later in the year. The 
officer remarked: 
 
“The chairman of our AC has agreed to organize a meeting with 
the external auditor. We really do need their input.” 
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It is apparent from the above remarks that the AC is aware of the importance of engaging with 
the external auditor. However, since it is stated in the Term of Reference for the ACs, it is 
advisable that the AC meet external auditors at least annually to discuss any issue that may 
offer benefit to both. 
 
Audit Committee Effectiveness 
When focussing on the composition of the IRBM’s AC, it appears that the committee comprises 
three members with non-executive capacity, two being independent members and one being a 
non-independent director. It was also revealed that one of the AC members had served the 
committee from 2005 in two different capacities. From 2005 until November 2010, the AC 
member was an Accountant General (AG) and sat on the board of the IRBM and chaired the 
AC. After his retirement (at the end of 2010), he sat on the board of the IRBM as an independent 
consultant from December 2010 and currently remains in this position at the time of this 
research and when the interview was conducted. At the same time, he also serves as a member 
of the AC, and now his former deputy is an AG and chairs the AC. This, according to him, will 
not affect his performance and independence in the committee. He remarked: 
 
“Although I was the chairperson before and now my former 
deputy in the Accountant General’s office has taken the role of 
the chairperson, this does not affect my professionalism. As an 
accountant I am professional.” 
 
Discussions with interview participants also revolve around the issue of how the AC members 
can actively engage in undertaking its governance role with the concern that inactive or non-
performing ACs will be a burden to the IRBM, as the time and resources of the organization 
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will be wasted. On the account that the AC has undertaken its role in an effective manner, the 
AC Chairperson remarked: 
 
“We have managed to do routine and special audits. So, we can 
identify any weaknesses in the bud. By going in and identifying 
certain weaknesses, we can also inform other IRBM’s branches 
to make sure they can check whether the mistake takes place or 
not.” 
 
The remarks by the AC Chairperson above were supported by the Director of Risk 
Management Division, who agreed that the AC has added value to the organization. The 
Director remarked: 
 “I find that the AC was very proactive and made a lot of 
suggestions and improvements. The risk management division 
was established due to the suggestion by one of the committee 
members.” 
 
Meanwhile, in highlighting the point regarding the effectiveness of the AC, the CEO seems to 
agree with the view of the AC Chairperson and Director of Risk Management Department. The 
CEO remarked: 
“AC complements and supports the oversight function of the 
Board by reinforcing the independence and objectivity of the 
Internal Audit Department. This adds value to the IRBM’s 
operation in order to achieve its objective.” 
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On the same subject of AC effectiveness, two interviewees gave cautious statements. One of 
them is the Director of Finance Department, who voiced his concern about the subject. He 
remarked: 
 
“The effectiveness of the AC depends on the Internal Audit 
Department, as most of the time the AC would rely on the audit 
report. So, the Internal Audit Department must have sufficient 
manpower and be equipped with the right knowledge and skills 
to do the job.” 
 
In fact, the significance of the internal auditor’s role has also been addressed in prior studies as 
contributing to financial statement audits and enhancing the effectiveness of the AC (see for 
example Goodwin, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Davies, 
2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). Essentially, the internal audit department carries the same 
requirement as the AC in that they should have at least financial knowledge and experience 
relating to accounting, audit and finance (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014). In the same subject, 
an AC member indicated that it is important for the AC to make self-evaluations on whether 
their role and function are seen by the relevant parties as significant and bringing improvement 
to how the IRBM operates. The AC member noted: 
 
“We need to look at the impact. If there was a mistake before 
and the situation has been improved, it can be said the AC’s role 
was effective. Otherwise, the stakeholders will perceive us as a 
burden to the organization or a waste of time and resources.” 
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On the other hand, the Director of Risk Management Department expressed his concern on the 
effectiveness of the AC in relation to the current state of IAD and AC operations. The Director 
noted that the audit functions of IAD, a department under direct supervision of the AC, are 
more focused on operational issues but not on the strategic issues4. In relation to this, the 
Director of Finance Department gave a suggestion on how the AC and IAD can become more 
relevant by contributing more to the organization in the future. The Director remarked: 
 
“The AC needs to check on effectiveness, efficiency and 
economics of the projects, activities and programs taken by the 
IRBM. The AC also needs to do a cost and benefit analysis.” 
 
In addition, the AC was perceived by the interview participants amongst the senior 
management of the IRBM as being responsible to pressure all organizational machineries 
within the organization to strive for achieving strategic goals set up by the IRBM. Such 
anticipation was given from the understanding that the AC is a committee of the BOD, and 
hence relevant parties associated with the AC should be directed towards the same strategic 
issues envisioned by the BOD. Interestingly, the expectation for the AC to contribute on 
strategic matters was not shared by the AC Chairperson, which contradicts the AC 
Chairperson’s earlier assertion that the AC was being proactive in many cases. The AC 
Chairperson noted: 
 
                                               
4 The operational issues of the IRBM include managing personnel issues and budgeting, while the strategic issues 
touch upon the core business of the IRBM such as tax collection, tax audit and tax investigation.  
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“We should perform risk-based auditing and review the 
accounting standard used in the preparation of the IRBM 
accounts.” 
The need to review the accounting standards used in preparing the financial statements of the 
IRBM raised above provide some signals where the AC could enhance its functions. Indeed, 
the anticipation of the IRBM’s senior management earlier and the lack of attention on essential 
issues as recognised by the AC Chairperson above give some indication on the quality of tasks 
undertaken by the AC. 
 
Conclusion 
This study examined the role and effectiveness of an AC in the context of a Malaysian large 
statutory body, i.e. the IRBM. The findings highlighted in this study shed important light on 
how the IRBM can enhance both efficiency and transparency in managing public money and 
its financial reporting through the effective functioning of its AC as a crucial organ of the board. 
 
This study also reports on the multiple roles played by the IRBM’s experienced AC members 
who support and assist the BOD in monitoring and reviewing risk, control and the governance 
process in the organization. Internally, that role must be undertaken by the AC to perform 
checks and balances in the areas of risk management, internal control and governance 
supported by a strong internal audit function. Although the AC has strong influence on the 
IRBM’s corporate culture, our attention was drawn to the lack of involvement of the AC in 
areas including supervision on compliance audits, taxation and on influencing the achievement 
of strategic goals within the power relations of the AC and the internal control system of the 
IRBM. Meanwhile, the aspiration to ensure AC functions that would best serve the interests of 
the public under the banner of public accountability appears to be compromised. In one aspect, 
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the independence of the AC comes into question, as the practice on the appointment of certain 
AC members does not appear to promote a cause for an effective governance role of the AC. 
We believe that there is an urgent need for the policy on the appointment of AC members to 
be re-examined, with changes introduced to appoint an independent outsider either from either 
one of the big four accountancy firms or an influential industry expert to the IRBM in 
undertaking its crucial task. On the other hand, the absence of meetings between the AC and 
the external auditor reflects the missing engagement of the two parties in improving the 
operations of the IRBM to the fullest expectation of the public. 
 
As with other research, this study also suffers from several limitations. First, our findings are 
based on the views of a limited number of key individuals around the important role of the AC 
of the IRBM. Therefore, future research should examine the informal governance process of 
the relevant parties within the power dynamic of the IRBM’s AC. It would also be interesting 
to investigate the possible tension that may arise in meeting the expected role of the AC for an 
organization responsible for collecting government revenue. To provide further insights into 
the issues examined in this paper, future research could examine the influence (if any) on 
changes in the regulatory setting, applicable accounting standards and the effectiveness of audit 
work undertaken by external auditors. Finally, the findings of our study also relate to a single 
statutory body; therefore, the findings cannot be generalised to all statutory bodies, including 
other public sector organisations in Malaysia.  
Appendix 
 
Table 1: Background Information of Interviewees 
No. Current Position in 
IRBM 
Number of years 
in current IRBM 
position 
Academic 
Qualification 
Other Position  
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1 AC Chairperson 
(non-independent 
executive director)  
3 years Masters  Accountant General 
Department 
2 AC Member 
(independent executive 
director) 
8 years Masters Former Accountant 
General Department 
3 Chief Executive Officer 34 years PhD  
4 Director of Finance 
Department 
12 years Bachelors  
5 Director of Internal 
Audit Department 
17 years Bachelors  
6 Director of Risk 
Management Division 
31 years Bachelors  
7 External Auditor 
 
3 years Masters   
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